Money politics is a serious problem for the improvement in the quality of democracy in Indonesia. In every election, there has been a shift or variation in the pattern of money politics. This article answers the important question of what pattern of money politics applied in the 2014 elections was. This study found that the pattern was more complex and that it involved more actors between not only candidates and voters, but also the election organizers. A case study had been used to view the pattern of money politics in the legislative elections in Surabaya and Sidoarjo during the 2014 election. This study explains the connectivity between the emergence of pragmatic-rational voters, the engagement of the party oligarchy in moving the political party machinery and the covert dealings with the election organizer.
. 1 Indonesian politics has been characterized by money politics during election, and how it controls voters, starting from grassroots people who receive a small amount of money to change their vote preferences until toplevel political party"s elite that get financial support from businessperson collaborators (Robinson & Hadiz, 2004) . At the local level, money politics also appears in political competitions through direct local elections (Pemilihan kepala daerah langsung, Pilkada) where patron and clientilism is bounded by using the power of money (Choi, 2004) .
The relationship model connecting the candidate and voters is the most important cause of the transaction.
Hidayat, ( In other cases, corruption and electoral democracy are called the two sides of a coin, especially where the patron-client relationship is still very strong (Barr & Serra, 2010; Gupta, 1995; Mas"udi, 2002; Paldam, 2002) . In a study conducted in North Sumatra, the mobilization of ethno-religious identity and money politics were found to characterize the so-called "patronage democracy". In conclusion, the lack of capacity for democratic governance in the regions and the deep-rooted patron-client networks rendered the transition towards difficulty in democratization (Simandjuntak, 2012) . Another important study on money politics in elections
shows that the patron-client model links the political elite with the grassroots group (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016) .
Money politics in local politics is an interesting topic. It deals with the lowincome society in rural areas and How people accepting the money are affected.
An insightful analysis on the stand of rural community to money politics in general election was conducted by Callaghan and MacCargo (1996) . Their study in
Northeastern of Thailand reveals that voters in rural areas expect lump-sum payment. The receivers of money were divided into three groups based on education and social class. Most groups outside the two categories receive cash.
The middle class receive a gift in the form of goods and the upper class receive invitations for dinner and drinking before the election. In general, the study points out that a candidate needs to combine money, phonngan (achievement) and bukaklik (personal characteristic) to succeed in an election.
In other Asian democratic countries, there are different form and pattern of money politics, which were also found in established democratic countries such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. In those countries, money politics works through scandals from politicians abusing the privilege and taking advantage of public fund for supporting their campaign (Pye, 1997 (Aspinall et al, 2017; Callahan & McCargo, 1996; Nichter, 2008) .
In this article, we report on a case study conducted in the Municipality of Education is an important factor affecting the voters" stand on money politics. The more educated the voters, the greater the possibility they reject money politics. (Republika, 2014b) .
The use of money during the campaign period is considered a symbol of power. Potential voters tend to choose leaders who show their prosperity as a manifestation of power that will ensure patron abilities to satisfy clients (Simandjuntak, 2012 (Hadiz, 2004; Sidel, 2005 
